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          The importance and need for sub-national fiscal reforms is all too
obvious in India where the States are facing severe fiscal imbalances
since the beginning of the nineties. A decade of political strife in the
eighties, followed by populist economic policies in the nineties led to a
massive fiscal deterioration in Punjab, hampering its overall growth
process. The Fiscal Reform Programme in the state was initiated in 1999
with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the
Government of India and the Punjab government. This was followed by
the setting up of various committees and commissions to look into the
problems of revenue mobilisation, expenditure management, public
enterprises and the power sector. The more recent effort towards fiscal
consolidation has been the enactment of Fiscal Responsibility and
Budget Management Act, 2003. The assessment of the entire fiscal
reform effort of the state reveals that the Punjab government is seized of
the seriousness of the situation, admits the gravity of consequences but
lacks the grit and determination to implement certain hard decisions for
fiscal restructuring. The government is very much caught up in the web
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of populist policies and succumbs readily to political pressure against
certain unpopular decisions for attaining fiscal stability. The success of
the fiscal reform programme depends only on the administrative
competence and political will of the government towards achieving long-
term fiscal consolidation and restoration of fiscal balances in the state.5
Fiscal Reforms at the Sub-National
Level: The Case of Punjab
Introduction
State governments play an important role in economic activities
in a federal setup like India. The critical role of state finances in the
realignment and restoration of the macro balance in the economy is well
recognised particularly in the context of economic restructuring. In a
liberalised economic environment, sub-national governments will have to
play a relatively more important role than in the past. Fiscal
decentralisation is necessary in the wake of empowerment of rural and
urban local bodies. This would essentially require the state governments
to substantially augment their resources.
Fiscal reforms are a necessary, though not a sufficient condition
for enabling the state governments to be more effective agents of
development.  Improving the efficiency, effectiveness and transparency
of government’s operations is equally important.  Reforms at the centre
in the early nineties paved the way for sub-national reforms.
Unfortunately, this reform process did not pick up until the second half of
the nineties when the state level fiscal crisis set in.   Several states
witnessed a slowdown in their growth rates relative to the level of the
eighties. Competition for private investment by the states led to
competitive tax concessions and incentives leading to fiscal imbalances
in the nineties.  Populist policies like free power and irrigation to the farm
sector compounded the problem. The states are unable to increase the
tax ratio as also improve the productivity of non-tax revenue. Political
compulsions do not allow the states to increase user charges (Rao,
2002). The Fifth Pay Commission award in 1997 further led to fiscal
deterioration on account of substantial pay increase.  The states were
also hit by higher interest rates on two counts: the interest rate on loans
from Government of India (GoI) to the states was raised towards market6
rates and states became increasingly dependent on ‘small savings’
loans, a relatively expensive form of debt.
The deterioration in the fiscal position of the states (and its
peaking in 1998-99) is also reflected in the ways and means advances
and overdraft position of the states with the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).
State governments resorted to overdraft and Ways and Means Advances
(WMA) much more frequently than prior to 1997-98.  The central
government was unable or unwilling to limit the borrowings of the state
governments. The debt of states as a result has gone up and sound
fiscal management at state level has become an urgent agenda of
reforms.   There has been a considerable increase in the off-budget
liabilities of the states.  Also the states have paid very little attention to
state level public enterprise reforms; instead, they use them for raising
loans from the capital market without central government permission.
state governments began to arrange for enterprises to borrow on their
behalf with a commitment to meet debt service obligations in full from the
budget, thus further reducing the scope of central government control
over borrowing behaviour (Howes et. al., 2003). The inefficient and
unmanageable state electricity boards continue to be a major financial
burden on the exchequer in the absence of power sector reforms. This
has resulted in fiscal imbalances faced by almost all states of India
including prosperous ones like Punjab, Maharashtra, and Gujarat.
The present study is an assessment of the fiscal reforms initiated
and implemented in Punjab in the backdrop of a fragile political history of
the state. Section II discusses the setting in of fiscal crisis in the state
and its likely causes. Section III brings to focus the recent (1998-2003)
fiscal scenario in Punjab. Sections IV and V deal with the implementation
of the reform process and its assessment respectively. The conclusions
of the study are summarised in the last section.
II. Fiscal Crisis in Punjab
Punjab, a predominantly agricultural economy, has the highest
per capita income among all the major Indian states. It has the lowest
poverty ratio of 6.2 percent as against an all- India average of 26.1
percent (Economic Survey, 2003-04). It seems that it is becoming7
increasingly difficult to maintain the pace of growth that Punjab
witnessed in the seventies and the eighties. There has been a
considerable slowdown in the nineties with the rate of growth of the
economy coming down to less than 2 percent as against an all-India
average of nearly 5 percent per annum,  whereas it was 6.4 percent
during the seventh five year plan when the all-India growth rate was 5.65
percent (Statistical Abstract, Punjab, 2003). The main reason for the
declining growth rate of the economy has been the decade-long civil
strife in the eighties coupled with a slowdown of the agricultural sector.
The average rate of growth of the primary sector was 5.5 percent in the
Sixth plan which has come down drastically to 1.8 percent during the
Ninth plan. The performance of this sector has been erratic during the
last one decade.
There are several reasons for the faltering performance of the
Punjab economy in the post-reform period when other states of India
began to perform better than before.   The fiscal crisis is a manifestation
of various political, economic and administrative failures of the
government during the period of militancy when the civil administration
was non-functional, ineffective and non-accountable. No effort in the
post-militancy period was made by the elected governments to put the
economy back on the path of economic development; attributing the
deteriorating fiscal situation of the nineties to the decade of political strife
in the state was considered enough.
Punjab has been under fiscal stress since 1984-85, when it
became a revenue deficit state.  In 1990-91 Punjab had the dubious
distinction of being amongst the states with the highest fiscal deficit.
There was minor fiscal consolidation in the mid-1990s but the position in
the late nineties once again deteriorated. According to the White Paper
on State Finances (2002), the factors which have adversely impacted the
state’s fiscal situation during the 1990s are ever increasing salaries and
wage bills of the employees, mounting debt burden, heavily subsidised
social and economic services,  slow growth of revenue and loss making
public sector undertakings (PSUs).  All this is compounded by the lagged
effect of terrorism on the growth of the state. This adversely affected the
buoyancy in tax revenue. During the prolonged spell of President’s rule
in the state, no additional resource mobilisation measures were taken.
The state had to incur a huge expenditure on combating the menace of
terrorism. The government of Punjab in the later years of 1990s followed
the populist path and allowed free power to the farm sector and8
abolished octroi, house tax, and land revenue. Vast losses incurred by
the State Electricity Board, low irrigation charges, uneconomic transport
fares have all combined to produce unduly low returns on decades of
past investments, which in turn have adversely affected further
investments in infrastructure and have also hurt the required expansion
in education, health,  and other social services.
The state’s own tax revenue has shown a continuously declining
trend. Tax revenue to Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) ratio
declined over a period of time. However, it increased from 6.75 percent
in 1991-92 to 7.62 percent in 1994-95. Thereafter, there was a steep
decline to 6 percent in 1998-99. State’s non-tax revenue to GSDP ratio
was only 1.35 percent in 1990-91, increased to 5.88 percent in 1994-95
and consistently declined till 1998-99 when it was 2.77 percent.  A study
of non-tax revenue reveals that user charges continued to be sub-
optimal and in fact the subsidies on most of the social and economic
services provided by the state increased in the post 1993-94 period.
Input subsidies which were to the tune of Rs. 409 crore in 1990-91, went
up to Rs. 2,000 crore in 2000-01. The capital expenditure to GSDP ratio
fell from 3.8 percent in 1990-91 to 1.7 percent in 2000-01. This has
affected the quality and reliability of the services provided to the people. 
An exogenous factor contributing to smaller resource availability
with the state government is the decline in the Punjab’s share in the
transfers from the Government of India according to the recommendations
of successive Finance Commissions. It was 1.712 percent under the Ninth
Finance Commission and came down to 1.461 percent under the Tenth
Finance Commission. The Eleventh Finance Commission also heavily
penalised the relatively developed states. This resulted in further reduction
in Punjab’s share to 1.147 percent. It is estimated that reduction in
Punjab’s share by the Eleventh Finance Commission has resulted in
decreasing the transfers from GoI by Rs.1550 crore during 2000-05
(Government of Punjab, 2002b).
The revenue expenditure of the Punjab government comprises
both developmental and non-developmental expenditure of which the
share of committed expenditure consisting of wages and salaries,
pensions and interest payment has registered a steep rise. Committed
expenditure as a percentage of revenue receipts was 76.99 percent in
1991-92, which sharply increased to 142.13 percent in 1998-99. The
poor growth in receipts and rapid growth in committed expenditure have9
resulted in a reduction in the share of capital expenditure. Capital outlay
as a proportion of GSDP has remained consistently below 2 percent,
falling below 1 percent in certain years. Also the composition of revenue
expenditure has shifted from the productive sectors in favour of general
services. The share of development expenditure i.e. expenditure on
social and economic services in total revenue expenditure declined from
65 percent in 1990-91 to 46 percent in 1999-2000. This composition of
expenditure is far from conducive for supporting the growth of physical
and social infrastructure, so essential for reviving buoyant growth in the
state. 
Revenue deficit of the state has been increasing implying lower
availability of funds for developmental/capital works. The revenue deficit
as a percentage of GSDP was 2.11 percent in 1991-92 and came down
to 1.17 percent in 1995-96. It increased sharply to 4.83 percent in 1998-
99.  The gap in revenue deficit is filled by high cost borrowing by the
state. This has led to more expenditure on interest payments and higher
debt burden. Borrowed funds are not used for productive purposes to
create capital assets which generate income to service the debt. Primary
deficit of the government, indicating the proportion of borrowing that goes
towards meeting expenditure other than interest payments, has also
shown a deteriorating trend. It was Rs.790 crore in 1991-92 and rose to
Rs.1,463 crore in 1998-99. 
The state has been heavily relying upon debt to augment its
resources. The debt of the state government, which was 36.38 percent
as a proportion of GSDP in end-March 1991 and rose to 40.66 percent of
GSDP in end-March 2001, was highly unsustainable and needs to be
capped. Most of the debt raised in the state is used for meeting the
revenue expenditure and day-to-day needs of the state. The entire plan
financed through loans and revenue expenditure is also financed through
borrowing. The high and growing volume of debt has resulted in
increasing liability for servicing the debt. Interest payment, is a
committed liability, accounts for a large part of the use of government
receipts. Proportion of revenue receipts spent on interest payments was
15.47 percent in 1991-92 and touched an all time high of 47.63 percent
in 1998-99. 
The state governments also stand guarantees for loans raised by
PSUs and other state institutions. In the event of inability of the
organisation to repay the loan and interest thereon, the guarantee can be10
invoked and the state has to bear the burden of the loan. In the case of
Punjab, the government has been standing guarantees for loans
indiscriminately and without assessing the repayment capability of the
organisation. Since the PSUs in Punjab are sinking into a debt trap, it is
almost certain that the liability of loans generated will devolve upon the
State government in the near future. 
The severity of the fiscal stress is further highlighted by the
number of days that Punjab was availing of WMA and was in overdraft
with the RBI.  In the first half of the nineties the State’s overdraft
increased somewhat from 6 days during the year 1992-93 to 26 days
during 1994-95 while the number of days that it was availing WMA went
up from 5 to 20. After 1995-96, however, there was a sharp increase and
during 1998-99 the number of days the state was in overdraft went up to
225 days with the state availing of WMA on 130 days. Thus, there were
only 10 days in the entire year when the state had a positive cash
balance.
The  Constitution (Seventy Third) Amendment Act, 1992 on
panchayats and the Constitution (Seventy Fourth) Amendment Act,
1992, on municipalities, provided for setting up of a State Finance
Commission to review the finances of these local bodies and suggest
measures for their revenue augmentation. The first Punjab Finance
Commission was constituted, accordingly, on April 22, 1994, to cover the
period from 1996-97 to 2000-01.  It identified the problems confronting
the  panchayats and municipalities in generating sufficient funds and
suggested the augmentation of the resources by levy of user charges for
the services rendered by them and levy and collection of taxes under
their purview. The Commission also suggested that no exemption be
provided from octroi by the state government.
The Second State Finance Commission was set up in
September, 2000 covering the period 2002-03 to 2005-06.  The
Commission submitted an interim report for the year 2001-02. The
Commission recommended the restructuring of certain taxes,
improvements in tax administration and prevention of evasion of taxes of
Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) and Urban Local Bodies (ULBs).  The
recommendations of the two State Finance Commissions remain
unimplemented in so far as the imposition of local taxes as well as
devolution of funds to ULBs and PRIs is concerned. There has been a
large shortfall in the transfer of funds to the local bodies as compared to11
the amounts due to them in accordance with the recommendations of the
First Finance Commission as accepted by the state government. The
ULBs received nearly 43 percent of the total assigned amount between
1996-97 and 2000-01 and the PRIs got only 35 percent of the budgeted
provisions.  The state government also did not give any grant to the
financially weak local bodies or incentive grant as reward for their
internal revenue effort.  Even after the commitment of the government
towards strengthening of ULBs and PRIs in the budget of 2002-03, full
amount of their share was not transferred to them.  This shows the
disregard of the government not only towards its own commitments but
also its constitutional obligations. 
III.  Fiscal Scenario in the Recent Past 
(1998-99 to 2002-03)
The fiscal scenario in the recent past in Punjab has been rather
dismal. Despite the government admitting to the need for fiscal
correction, sectoral reforms and reduction of deficits, very little has been
achieved on this front. Various parameters like revenue, expenditure,
debt, indicators of fiscal imbalances etc. are studied below to assess the
actual position. The tables are based on the data from the budget
documents of the Punjab government for various years, unless otherwise
specified.
Revenue receipts (RR) of the government increased from Rs.
5,755 crore in 1998-99 to Rs. 11,071 crore in 2002-03, at an average
trend rate of 13.15 percent per annum.  There were, however, significant
inter year variations in the growth rates.  Of particular significance were
the decline in 2001-02 and an impressive upturn in the subsequent year
to nearly 24 percent.  This happened due to 18.5 percent increase in tax
revenue and 36.35 percent increase in the non-tax revenue. 12
Table 1: Revenue Receipts of the Punjab Government




5755 7468 9377 8929 11071
Percentages of Revenue Receipts
Own Taxes 56.68 52.85 52.20 53.98 51.58
Non-Tax
Revenue
26.19 31.63 31.30 33.15 36.46
Central Tax
Transfers
10.20 8.56 7.68 6.84 5.86
Grant-in-aid 6.93 6.96 8.82 6.03 6.10
Rate of
Growth of RR
 -9.38* 29.77 25.56 -4.78 23.99
RR/GSDP 10.58 11.91 13.70 11.62 12.83
*    1997-98 has been taken as base year for calculating rate of growth.
While on an average around 85 percent of the revenue came
from the government’s own resources, central tax transfers and grants-
in-aid together contributed nearly 15 percent of the total revenue.
Contribution of grants-in-aid declined to 6.10 percent in 2002-03 from
6.93 percent in 1998-99 and contribution of central tax transfers
continued to decline throughout the period and came down to 5.86
percent in 2002-03 from 10.20 percent during 1998-99.
            The total expenditure of the Government of Punjab increased
from Rs. 9,642 crore in 1998-99 to Rs. 15,584 crore in 2002-03 at an
average trend rate of 13.02 percent per annum.  Leaving aside 2000-01,
when the growth rate touched a whopping 24.48 percent,  the growth
rate has been hovering between 8 to 12 percent until 2002-03, when the
growth of expenditure has been brought down to a more appropriate
5.58 percent, accelerating the rate of decline that began during the
previous year.  Consequently, total expenditure–GSDP ratio has also
fallen from 19.59 percent in 2000-01 to 18.07 percent in 2002-03.13
Table 2: Total Expenditure of the Punjab Government








8.05 11.71 24.48 10.08 5.58
TE/GSDP  17.72 17.18 19.59 19.20 18.07
The relative share of activity components in total expenditure is










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03
Chart 1: Components of Expenditure - 






















The movement of relative share of these components of
expenditure indicated that while the share of economic services and
social services in total expenditure declined from 23.96 percent and
28.09 percent to 17.24 percent and 20.82 percent respectively during
1998-2003,  the relative share of general services, which are primarily14
non-developmental in nature, increased from 45.98 percent in 1998-99 to
58.35 percent of total expenditure in 2002-03.  Thus, the appreciable
decline in the volume of total expenditure is not so appreciable after all;
when viewed in terms of application to activity, it is the non-
developmental general services which have gained at the expense of the
developmental services.  Interpreted in this light, reduced expenditure
would denote a certain loss of developmental impetus in the important
areas of governance.
Revenue expenditure (RE), which constituted the largest bulk
(95.13%), was incurred to maintain the current level of services and did
not represent a significant addition to the state’s service network.
Revenue expenditure, its rate of growth, ratio of revenue expenditure to
state’s GSDP and revenue receipts are indicated in the following table:
Table 3: Revenue Expenditure of the Punjab Government
1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03




7.01* 21.60 14.89 8.51 16.64
RE/GSDP 15.41 16.26 17.11 16.54 17.19
RE/TE 86.95 94.65 87.36 86.11 95.13
RE /RR 145.68 136.52 124.91 142.35 133.91
* 1997-98 has been taken as base year for calculating rate of growth.
  Revenue expenditure of the state increased from Rs. 8,384 crore
in 1998-99 to Rs. 14,825 crore in 2002-03, at an average trend rate of
13.97 per cent per annum.  The increase in the revenue expenditure
during 2002-03 was mainly due to increase in expenditure on general
education, pensions, state lotteries and interest payments.  Though ratio
of revenue expenditure to revenue receipts declined from 145.68 percent
in 1998-99 to 133.91 percent in 2002-03, yet dependence of the
government on borrowed funds persisted for even meeting the current
expenditure primarily due to the fact that salaries, interest payments,
pension dues and expenditure on state lotteries alone went 11 percent
beyond the total revenue receipts of the state during the year.15
              The quality of expenditure can be judged from the percentage of
plan expenditure, capital expenditure and development expenditure in
total expenditure of the state government. The chart below depicts the
same:
   
























          All the three components of expenditure show a relative decline
during 1998-2003.  Plan expenditure declined from 15.73 percent of total
expenditure in 1998-99 to 10.53 percent in 2002-03.  Similarly, capital
expenditure also declined from 11.97 percent in 1998-99 to 2.76 percent
in 2002-03.  There was also a decline in the share of development
expenditure from 52.69 percent in 1998-99 to 38.90 percent in 2002-03.
The share of expenditure on these components decreased significantly
in 2002-03 as compared to the level achieved in 1998-99. This further
corroborates the decline in development works and service delivery in
the State.
          The deficit in the government accounts represents the gap
between its receipts and expenditure.  The nature of deficit is an
indicator of the prudence of fiscal management of the government.
Further, the manner in which the deficit is financed, and the resources
raised are applied are important pointers to its fiscal health. 16
The chart below represents the gap between the revenue
receipts and revenue expenditure as percentages of GSDP:







1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03
RR/GSDP
RE/GSDP
               
The revenue receipts as percentage of GSDP increased
marginally from 10.58 in 1998-99 to 12.58 in 2002-03 and the revenue
expenditure as percentage of GSDP also increased correspondingly
from 15.41 in 1998-99 to 17.19 in 2002-03. Thus, the gap between the
two did not slim down during the period.
The revenue deficit of the state increased from Rs. 2,629 crore in
1998-99 to Rs. 3,754 crore in 2002-03. Out of the 5 years under study,
the state had a nominal primary revenue surplus only in 2000-01. This
reflects the inability of the state to match its current revenue to current
expenditure.  The fiscal deficit, which represents the total borrowing of
the Government and its total resource gap, increased from Rs. 3,780
crore in 1998-99 to Rs. 4,410 crore in 2002-03.  The state also had a
primary deficit of Rs. 1,463 crore in 1998-99  which decreased to Rs. 976
crore in 2002-03. Table 4 shows the fiscal imbalances in Punjab.   17
Table 4: Fiscal Imbalances in Punjab 
       (Rs. crore)
1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03
Revenue Deficit
(RD)
2629 2727 2336 3781 3754
Primary Revenue
Deficit (PRD)
312 90 (-) 07 603 320
Fiscal Deficit (FD) 3780 3194 3904 4959 4410
Primary Deficit
(PD)
1463 557 1561 1781 976
Per cent
RD/GSDP  4.83 4.35 3.41 5.27 5.13
PRD/GSDP 0.57 0.14 (-) 0.01 0.84 0.44
FD/GSDP 6.95 5.09 5.70 6.91 6.03
PD/GSDP 2.69 0.89 2.28 2.48 1.33
RD/FD 69.55 85.38 59.84 76.25 85.12
The ratio of revenue deficit to fiscal deficit increased from 69.55
percent in 1998-99 to 85.12 percent in 2002-03 indicating further
deterioration in the State finances. As a proportion to GSDP, though the
revenue deficit has decreased marginally to 5.13 percent and fiscal
deficit to 6.03 percent in 2002-03, yet large revenue and fiscal deficits
year after year have corroded the financial health of the state. 
The fiscal liabilities of the state increased from Rs. 21,705 crore
in 1998-99 to Rs. 38,315 crore in 2002-03 at an average annual rate of
16.39 percent.  














21705 24804 28957 33921 38315 29540
Rate of Growth
(percent)
21.55 14.28 16.74 17.14 12.95 16.39
Ratio of Fiscal Liabilities to: (percent)
GSDP 39.9 39.6 42.3 44.1 44.4 42.4
Revenue receipts 377.2 332.1 308.8 379.9 346.1 346.718
The ratio of fiscal liabilities to GSDP increased from 39.9 percent
in 1998-99 to 44.4 percent in 2002-03 and the fiscal liabilities were 3.46
times of the revenue receipts in 2002-03. 
An important indicator of debt sustainability is net availability of
funds after payment of the principal on account of the earlier contracted
liabilities and interest.  The table below gives the position of the receipt
and repayment of public debt over the last five years.  The net funds
available were to the tune of 20.14 percent of total fresh loans in 2002-
03. The major chunk of repayment has gone towards interest payment,
being 80 percent in 1998-99 and coming down to nearly 70 percent in
2003-04.
Table 6: Net Availability of Borrowed Funds
(Rs. crore)
1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03
Total Public Debt




















0.8 4.8 37.8 32.2 20.14
*Figures in brackets are interest as percentage of repayment.
During the year, the state repaid the high cost loans and
advances from Government of India (GoI) bearing coupon rates in
excess of 13 percent per annum after borrowing funds from the open
market at the weighted average rate of 7.14 percent.  As a result, the net
availability of funds was reduced to 20.14 percent from 32.2 percent in
previous year.  The maturity profile of the outstanding market loans as on
March 31, 2003, indicated that nearly 25 percent of the loans are
payable within five years while the remaining loans are required to be
repaid during the next five years. 
Punjab government had guaranteed loans of Rs. 13,734 crore
availed by its Corporations and others as of March 31, 2003.  The
guarantees are in the nature of contingent liabilities of the state and in19
the event of non-payment,  the state has to honour these commitments.
The year-wise position of the maximum amounts for which guarantees
were given by the state government to the end of March 2003 is shown
in Table 7.
Table 7: Guarantees of the State Government 








1998-99 7408 3294 96 129
1999-00 12059 9861 90 162
2000-01 7331 8868 122 78
2001-02 10244 10244 340 115
2002-03 17720 13255 479 160
The amount of outstanding guarantees increased from Rs. 3,390
crore in 1998-99 to Rs. 13,734 crore in 2002-03 and amounted to 124
percent of the revenue receipt (Rs. 11,071 crore) of the state
government in 2002-03. 
It is generally desirable that state’s flow of resources should
match its expenditure obligations.  However, to take care of any
temporary mismatches in the flow of resources and the expenditure
obligations, the state has been increasingly relying on the WMA from RBI
over the years. Normally these advances should be liquidated during the
year.  Any outstanding balances of WMA indicate mismatch in the
revenue and expenditure. Resort to overdraft, which is over and above
WMA limits, is all the more undesirable. The following table gives the
WMA and overdraft position of the Punjab government as reported in the
Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India, March,
2003. 20
Table 8: Ways and Means and Overdrafts of the State and 
Interest paid thereon 
(Rs. crore)
1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03
Ways and Means Advances
taken in the
year
1279.58 1851.66 2170.77 1976.61 3127.90
Outstanding 179.40 182.12 243.42 221.42 185.79




3840.23 1178.22 1600.10 3826.70 640.74
outstanding 826.51 101.92 48.37 196.36 Nil




225 84 107 119 53
          
Under an agreement with the RBI, the state government has to
maintain with the bank a minimum balance of Rs. 1.56 crore on all days.
If this balance falls below the agreed minimum on any day, the deficiency
is made good by taking WMA and the maximum limit for ordinary WMA is
Rs. 235 crore. Beyond this, the shortfall is bridged by special WMA, the
limits for which vary from time to time and the further gap is filled by
overdraft. During 1998-2003, Punjab has always overstepped its WMA
limit many times over the prescribed amount and has been in overdraft
for an average of 118 days. However, over a period of these 5 years, the
dependence of the state government on RBI for cash management has
declined from 225 days in 1998 to 53 days in 2003 but the dependence
on WMA has increased.
        It is evident from an overview of state finances in Punjab that the
state has been continuously facing fiscal crisis and is heavily dependent
on borrowed funds for meeting its general governance needs and
development obligations.  The fiscal stress on the state government has
resulted in eroding its capacity to implement national programmes and
even to take advantage of funds available from GoI and other national
and international agencies. Therefore, the fiscal reforms at the state level
have gained increasing focus in recent years. 21
IV.  Fiscal Reforms in Punjab
The states have taken a number of corrective measures towards
fiscal consolidation to restore fiscal stability and achieve a balanced
revenue account, which is an important indicator of fiscal prudence. In
view of the fiscal distress experienced by Punjab for over a decade now,
it is imperative that the government takes some measures for fiscal
reforms in the state. The fiscal restructuring measures are intended to
address several long-term issues in revenue mobilisation, expenditure
management, PSU reforms, infrastructure development and
improvement in the funding of ULBs and PRIs.
         Punjab’s finances are afflicted both by structural problems and
problems of cash flow management. One of the first major
manifestations of this came in April, 1999, when Punjab’s overdraft with
the RBI was Rs. 775 crore for the 8
th consecutive day, calling for urgent
corrective action (GoP, 2002b). In pursuance of the decision of the GoI
to provide assistance to the state governments in order to strengthen
their financial situation, the Government of Punjab signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the GoI. The agreement
reached between Ministry of Finance, GoI and Government of Punjab is
termed as Fiscal Reform Programme for Punjab. According to this
agreement, the Ministry of Finance would provide immediate assistance
to help the state government get out of the overdraft. The assistance
comprised permitting state government to carry out market borrowing
immediately and on priority basis, making advanced devolution and
releases of Central Plan Assistance and WMA. These releases and
permission were conditional in that the state government would raise its
internal resources and agree to undertake time-bound action on the
reform programme. 
  The MoU stated that in order to increase revenues and reduce
expenditure, the state government would draw up an implementation
plan, giving details of the various actions, the agencies responsible for
carrying out these actions and a time frame within which the actions
would be completed. The MoU listed certain measures for improving the
fiscal situation. These were reduction in non-plan revenue expenditure,
reduction in subsidies through improved cost recovery for both social and
economic services, withdrawal of tax incentives to industries,22
disinvestment, reform of tax regime and improvement in management of
public debt.
  However, even after signing the MoU, progress towards fiscal
consolidation was poor. The action taken report submitted by the
Government of Punjab to the GoI in November 2000 indicated a lack of
headway made on this front. The Punjab government continued to face
financial problems. Non-plan expenditure, which was to be reduced by 5
percent in 1999-2000 from its level in 1998-99, actually increased by 7
percent during that period. The state government took certain policy
initiatives in the state budgets of 2000-01 and 2001-02. The fiscal
measures spelt out in these budgets included rightsizing the government,
rationalisation of tax structure, compression of non-productive
expenditure and revision of user charges. The institutional reforms
announced included the constitution of Public Expenditure Reforms
Commission and Public Sector Disinvestment Commission, preparation
of MoU with the Government of India on power sectors reforms and
notification of State Electricity Regulatory Commission. These budgets
also took note of certain sectoral reforms to be undertaken. 
  Despite the set of measures announced by the government
towards fiscal reforms, Punjab continued to face a severe financial
crunch. The state was increasingly relying on the RBI to tide over its day-
to-day crisis. The state’s account with the RBI was running in an
overdraft of Rs. 168.29 crore as on March 2, 2002. Faced with the
precarious situation, the Punjab government had been using the
guarantee route for solving its liquidity problems. In the process it
impaired its own solvency. 
  The change of government in the state in February 2002 and the
subsequent announcement of the various budgetary and fiscal reforms
provided yet another opportunity for fiscal consolidation.
  Realising the gravity of the financial crises the government
brought out a White Paper on the State’s Finances in March, 2002. The
budget for the year 2002-03 focused on certain fiscal reforms including
corrective measures for restoration of financial health of the state.  The
government committed itself to correcting institutional factors leading to
economic and financial distortions. 23
A plethora of committees and commissions have brought out
their recommendations regarding certain sectoral reforms in the state as
well as improvement in management of state finances.  Several studies
have been carried out by NIPFP on behalf of the World Bank, New Delhi,
to identify the malady as also to suggest solutions to it. An expert
committee to suggest power sector reforms gave its recommendations,
Disinvestment Commission for the Restructuring of the State-level Public
Enterprises submitted its report in September 2002, and the report of the
Public Expenditure Reforms Commission is available with the
Government of Punjab since October 2002.  All these documents have
suggested the implementation of major structural reforms in the State
finances and administration for resource augmentation and expenditure
management.  The most important and recent step in this direction has
been the enactment of Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management
Act (FRBMA) in May 2003. The state government signed another MoU
with the Ministry of Finance, GoI on July 23, 2003 to achieve fiscal
sustainability in the medium term.
FRBMA attests the seriousness with which the government
seeks to tackle the problems of revenue and fiscal deficits and the high
ratio of public debt to GSDP. The primary motives of the act are:
“To provide for the responsibility of the State
government to ensure inter-generational equity in
fiscal management and long-term financial
stability by achieving sufficient revenue surplus,
containing fiscal deficit and prudential debt
management consistent with fiscal sustainability
through limits on the State government
borrowings, debt and deficits, greater
transparency  in fiscal operations of the State
government and conducting fiscal policy in a
medium-term framework and for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto”
(Punjab Gazette, 2003).
                A recent study (Rajaraman, 2004) examines the fiscal
responsibility legislations enacted by the governments of Karnataka,
Kerala, Punjab and Tamil Nadu. The following table showing the features
of FRBMA, Punjab, is an extract from this study.24
Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, Punjab
   
            
The appreciable design features of the Punjab Act are as follows:
•  The quantified limits to revenue and overall fiscal imbalances are in
general specified for a stated target year, 2006-07. Punjab has
annual path limits as shown in the table above.
•  The correction of the revenue deficit is sharper than the correction of
the fiscal deficit, which permits high rate of increase in capital
expenditure, but requires a sharp reduction in (non-interest) revenue
expenditure.
•  The single most effective element, the inflexible limit imposed on
long term government guarantees, i.e., 80 percent of revenue
receipts of the previous year, is a good design feature.
•  The act clearly states that for the purpose of the definition of fiscal
deficit, off budget borrowings shall be treated as borrowings by the
state government, and the expenditure incurred on subsidies due to
the enterprises in the power sector, whether paid or not, shall be
treated as expenditure by the state government. This introduces
transparency in borrowings and expenditure of the government.
•  The act also ensures that government shall present before the State
Legislative Assembly in each financial year, the medium term fiscal
Notified:                                       5 May, 2003, Act No. 11
Documentary Obligations:               MTFP-3  year  Quarterly
Review
Targets:
      RD:                                             Path: ￿5% RR fall/year
                                                          Target: 0 (no year)
      FD:                                              Path:  ￿2%  absolute
increase / year
                                                          Target: 3% GSDP (no year)
Modifiable for:                                    Calamity
Guarantees:                                      Cap:  80%  of  RR  of  the
previous year
Total Debt:                                        40% of GSDP by March 31,
2007
Protection:                                        No fiscal sops six months
before elections.25
policy statement along with the annual budget. This will include an
assessment of sustainability relating to balance between revenue
receipts and expenditure, use of capital receipts and market
borrowings for generating productive assets, fiscal performance of
the state and future prospects for growth.
•  For ensuring that the government adheres to the programme, the act
provides for corrective measures that are automatically to be
undertaken once the actual deficits show signs of exceeding their
targeted value in any year.
•  The act protects against election year opportunism as it carries a
specific ban on fiscal sops 6 months before elections.
         Rajaraman  emphasises  that  Punjab  will  have  to  exceed  the
annual path limits in order to meet the debt target. Also without added
revenue effort, the fiscal compression imposed by the fiscal responsibility
legislation will not be possible. The state is dependent on own revenues
to a large extent, which implies that the revenue effort of the state has to
be stepped up considerably without damaging the quality of public
service delivery.
          The Act should be effective in achieving the targets and should
go a long way in making the budgetary process transparent.  The
government is required to lay on the table all cards relating to its
perception of the emerging economic trends and the macroeconomic
framework behind formulation of short term and medium term policies.
V.  An Assessment of the Fiscal Reform Programme
of the Punjab Government
             The deteriorating finances of the Punjab government are a
matter of  concern as these are leading to compression of developmental
expenditure and burgeoning non-developmental expenditure. All the
institutional and sectoral measures suggested by the Government of
India, Reserve Bank of India and other agencies to attain fiscal balances
at the sub-national level have been adopted by Punjab over a period of
time. Signing of MoU with the Government of India, Medium Term Fiscal
Programme and enactment of FRBMA etc. suggest that the state26
government is seized of the situation and admits the gravity of the
consequences of non-compliance to the reform programme.
        An evaluation of the fiscal reform programme of the state over
the last few years reveals that the Government of Punjab has not
adhered to the recommendations of most of the committees and
commissions and the financial targets laid down in various documents
have not been achieved. No action to implement the recommendations
of the Public Expenditure Reforms Commission for compressing
government expenditure, improving the service delivery, restructuring of
government departments and agencies, withdrawal of subsidies, and
imposition of user charges has been taken by the government as
reflected in the study of Action Taken Report on Fiscal Reform Measures
(Annual Financial Statement, GoP, 2004-05). Most of the reforms in the
power sector as committed by the Government of Punjab in the MoU
signed in March 2001, between the Ministry of Power, GoI and
Department of Irrigation and Power, GoP, have not been implemented so
far (CAG, 2003). The commitment towards these reforms is reiterated
once again in the Budget Speech of 2004-05, thus admitting its non-
compliance.*
           Recommendations of the Disinvestment Commission submitted in
September 2002 and the government decision to disinvest in six PSUs
are yet to be implemented. The report of CAG reveals that the
government has failed to achieve the set target of Rs. 50 crore to be
garnered through such disinvestments.   No disinvestment and
privatisation of PSUs has taken place during 2002-03.  In the case of
nine companies, notices were published at various points of time
between May 1998 and March 2003 for their dissolution.  But no definite
orders have been issued so far.  The merger of one company identified
for the purpose was to be effective from 31
  March, 2001, but no
notification has been issued so far.  Some of the working companies
have been incurring losses for more than five consecutive years leading
to their negative net worth.  Besides, five companies could not
commence business activities despite being in existence for more than
eleven years. Sixteen out of 33 statutory corporations and government
companies with an aggregate investment of Rs. 412.87 crore were
running at a loss and the accumulated losses were Rs.1290.90 crore.
An in-depth analysis of the working of the government brings into
focus certain practices, which reflect misallocation and misutilisation of27
funds by the government.  Also, the lack of transparency in management
of public funds is evident as brought out by the CAG. As per Article 205
of the Constitution of India, it is mandatory for a state government to get
the excess over a grant/appropriation regularised by the state legislature.
However, the excess expenditure amounting to Rs. 1849.63 crore for the
years 1996-97 to 2001-02 had not been regularised by July, 2003.  This
was breach of legislative control over appropriations.  
The financial rules require that government expenditure should
be evenly distributed throughout the year.  The rush of expenditure
particularly in the closing months of the financial year is regarded as
breach of financial rules.  The expenditure pattern (revenue and capital)
of most of the departments of Punjab Government for 2002-03 revealed
that there was a tendency to utilise the budget to the extent of nearly 40
to 100 percent in certain cases at the end of the financial year.
Articles 266 and 283 of the Constitution of India provide that all
receipts of the state should be credited to the Consolidated Fund of the
State and withdrawal of money therefrom should be regulated by law
made by the legislature of the state.  Accordingly, fees/cess levied
through acts of legislature of the state and sale proceeds of government
lands should be credited to the consolidated fund of the state.  It was
noticed that in four Funds namely ‘The Cattle Fair Fund’ (CFF) (February
1968), The Punjab Education Development Fund (PEDF) (August 1998),
The Punjab Infrastructure Development Fund (PIDF) (December 1998)
and the Punjab Infrastructure Fund (PIF) (February 2001), receipts
aggregating Rs. 527.27 crore realised during 1998-2003 on account of
fees in cattle fairs, cess on sale of liquor, beer, petrol, and agricultural
produce and sale proceeds of lands were credited to the respective
funds rather than to the consolidated fund of the state which resulted in
reduction in receipts deposited in the consolidated fund.  Transfer of
substantial money to various funds resulted in incurring of substantial
expenditure without budgetary control of the state legislature. 
During the period June, 2000 to December, 2001, immediately
before the assembly elections in Punjab, the then Chief Minister started
visiting various places for meeting the general public and disbursing
funds to people under the name Sangat Darshan Programme.  No
separate budget/funds were provided by the State government for the
programme. As reported by CAG, money was mainly withdrawn from
Chief Minister’s Relief Fund and other development funds of the state. 28
The money was irregularly disbursed without prior identification of
purpose and without assessing the requirement of funds. Further money
from various development funds was disbursed mainly for purposes not
included under their respective acts. Contrary to the acts governing the
funds, all administrative and financial powers were entrusted to the Chief
Minister. Evidently, public money was unauthorisedly drawn and
disbursed without approval of norms/procedures by the government. 
Mandi fees and rural development cess are collected by the
Mandi Committees and retained by the Mandi Board and Rural
Development Board respectively. These proceeds are meant to be
utilized for building infrastructure in the Mandis and rural areas. But, in
the absence of a rigorous system of transparency and accountability, the
proceeds have been used in an unauthorised and sub-optimal way.
There was an irregularity in the food account of the State since
1995-96.  RBI sanctions a Cash Credit Limit to the State government for
funding procurement of food grains.  When the foodgrains move from the
godowns and are paid for by the Food Corporation of India, the funds are
to be passed on to the State Bank of India.  But a closer scrutiny of the
food account showed that these funds were not returned to SBI but stood
out as debt of the State government.  An amount of Rs. 2,360 crores was
diverted from the food account to meet the committed expenditure of the
government upto March 2002.  The present government also continued
the same practice and diverted Rs.1900 crores in a single year, i.e.,
2002-03.  The food account has been taken out of the State budget since
April 1, 2003.  This will hopefully put a stop to an improper access to this
money that was leading to high debt burden. The State government has
incorporated a separate undertaking, viz., Punjab State Grains
Procurement Corporation Limited to undertake trade, purchase, storage,
movement, including inter-State movement, distribution and sale of
foodgrains and other foodstuffs. This is expected to introduce the much
desired transparency in the management of food account. 
          
A further scrutiny of the State government’s budget reveals that
there are variations between budget estimates, revised estimates and
actuals.  This deviation has also been pointed out by the Public
Expenditure Reforms Commission, 2002.  This is an evidence of poor
fiscal marksmanship indicating that the budgeting process fails to provide
a mechanism for appropriate expenditure management to ensure that
the policy goals of the government are not undermined.  The government29
has also flouted certain recommendations of various commissions
regarding revenue mobilisation.  The government reduced the rate of
road tax in December, 2000 and again in January, 2002 resulting in a
loss of Rs. 56.43 crore per annum.  The government also does not make
enough effort to mobilise arrears of revenue from various departments,
which amounted to Rs. 3,004.85 crore at the end of 2002-03.  CAG has
brought several other cases of irregularity in release and utilisation of
funds to light.  Many instances of under assessment/short-levy/non-
levy/incorrect computation and consequent loss of revenue have been
identified. The abolition of octroi with effect from December, 2001, which
constituted nearly two-third of the own revenues of the ULBs, starved
these further for funds. This defeats the very purpose of the provisions
regarding the setting up of the state finance commissions. 
       
The state government stands guarantee for the borrowings of
state PSUs. In consideration of guarantees given by the government,
guarantee fee is charged by it from the recipient institutions. The
recipient institutions, in many cases, have not paid the guarantee fee and
in some cases it has been waived off.   State government has also given
guarantee for loss making units, adding to the risk of principal and
interest thereon.  The guarantees are extended for various institutions as
a matter of routine without verifying their credit worthiness.  Also, as per
the MoU (1999), non-merit subsidies were to be reduced in a phased
manner; but contrary to this objective, these subsidies increased from
Rs. 407.47 crore in 1999-2000 to Rs. 589.64 crore in 2002-2003.
           
Fiscal consolidation and stability in the state can be achieved
only if there is a realisation on the part of the government to shun
populist policies and clamour for retaining power at all costs.  A strong
commitment is essential for taking hard decisions.  The postponement of
vital reform measures like implementation of value added tax (VAT),
power sector reforms, restructuring of staff deployment in government
departments, and disinvestment in state PSUs exhibit a complete lack of
seriousness regarding the fiscal reform programme in the state.  The
sanctity and importance of the state budget for the members of the
legislative assembly can be gauged from the fact that in June 2004, the
state government budget for 2004-05 amounting to Rs. 30,000 crore was
passed in only 23 minutes.  This reflects the absence of deliberations on
such an important document of the state.  Also, the downsizing of the
Punjab Cabinet in July 2004 as per the constitutional requirements was
merely an eyewash.  The purpose of limiting the number of ministers was30
to reduce the cost to the public exchequer, which was flouted with
impunity. While the number of ministers was reduced, there has been a
phenomenal increase in the number of Chairmen of State Public
Enterprises and Parliamentary Secretaries. They enjoy almost the same
salary and allowances as their ministerial counterparts and cost the
exchequer as much.  Another instance of gross misuse of political power
against the interest of the state has been to grant certain concessions to
some selected distilleries (a non-priority area). The excise concessions
will be availed of in 10 years and will amount to a decline of about a
fourth of the state’s excise duty from distilleries. Besides excise
concessions, these units have also received exemption from electricity
duty for 5 years and stamp duty on land purchased for the unit. All this
smacks of utter disregard for the government’s own commitments
towards fiscal prudence and austerity amounts to profligacy on the part
of the state government.
  
Medium Term Fiscal Programme, 2003, of the Government of
Punjab lays down certain objectives for reducing the revenue deficit as
percentage of revenue receipts and fiscal deficit as a percentage of
GSDP. The targets are compared with the achievements as brought out
in Medium Term Fiscal Reform Programme, 2004, on the basis of
actuals of 2002-03, revised estimates (RE) of 2003-04, budget estimates
(BE) for 2004-05 and projected estimates for 2005-06 in the following
table:
Table 9: Review of Fiscal Reform Programme 
(figures in percentages)
Objectives (MTFP 2003) Achievements (MTFRP 2004) Year
RD/RR FD/GSDP RD/RR FD/GSDP
2002-03 27.35 (RE) 6.05 (RE) 33.91 (Actuals) 6.03 (Actuals)
2003-04 24.45 6.05 25.88 (RE) 7.23 (RE)
2004-05 20.63 5.23 21.96 (BE) 6.79 (BE)




        The government has failed to reduce the revenue deficit as a
proportion of revenue receipts in 2002-03, whereas it has been
successful in reducing the fiscal deficit to GSDP ratio marginally. But the
data for the subsequent years reflect that none of the objectives are31
likely to be met. This brings to focus the fact that the government is not
paying much attention towards achieving the objectives laid down in the
MTFP 2003. Also the objectives in MTFRP 2004 show that these have
been revised upwards so as to create a favourable impression.
 
The report of the CAG corroborates that according to the MoU
(April, 1999), the revenue deficit as a proportion of revenue receipts was
to be reduced by 5 percent each year from 1999-2000. Accordingly, the
revenue deficit of 37 percent during 1999-2000 should have been
restricted to 32, 27 and 22 percent of revenue receipts during 2000-01,
2001-02 and 2002-03 respectively. The actual deficit, however, after a
dip in 2000-01 (25 %) was much above the target and increased to 42
percent and 33.91 percent in 2001-02 and 2002-03 respectively. 
            A review of FRBMA shows that it does not provide any targets
for time bound minimum improvements in investment in human resource
development and infrastructure, which are crucial for both equity and
rapid economic growth.  However, it makes an allowance for not meeting
the targets due to calamity declared by the central/state government.  It
only mentions about the estimate of non-compliance.  It provides for an
independent agency to carry out the periodic review for the compliance
of the provisions of the act.  The act does not seriously address the
problem of financing public expenditure.  In the context of the decline in
the tax-GDP ratio during the nineties, targets for an increase in this rate
should have been accorded top priority.  Not only is there an absence of
any such target, but also the need for effectiveness of tax administration
and collection is not recognised in the act. The achievement of the
targets of revenue and fiscal deficit and a cap on debt and guarantees as
given in the FRBMA can be assessed only when the actual data for
2003-04 are available. However, an attempt is made to review the act on
the basis of the revised estimates (RE) for 2003-04.32
Table 10: FRBMA Compliance 
(figures in percent)
2002-03 2003-04 Change over
previous year
Remarks
FD/GSDP*  6.03 7.23 Increase of
1.20
Non-compliance
RD/RR  33.91 25.88 Decline by 8.03 Compliance






153.80 122.56 Decline by
31.24
Far from 80% cap in
the Act
 *GSDP for the year 2003-04 has been projected at 11 % over 2002-03 (Quick
estimates) as per MTFRP, 2004.
     
Except for compliance of revenue deficit as proportion of
revenue receipts, the government has failed to even remotely adhere to
the FRBMA. This reflects the non-seriousness of the government
towards its own commitments.          
    
      For high growth along with the rapid elimination of the major ills
plaguing the Punjab economy, it may not be enough to lay down targets
for the revenue surplus and leave it to the government to choose the
fiscal deficit it considers appropriate.  The reasons brought out by
Rakshit (2001) are valid as (i) the same amount of deficit can come
about through a wide variety of scale and composition of the government
budget, affecting the primary objectives differently; and (ii) given the
close connection between fiscal deficit and revenue balances over time,
the government may continue to opt for scaling down urgently needed
expenditure rather than raise taxes and rationalise prices of publicly
provided goods and services.  In view of the government’s responsibility
relating to growth and human resource development, FRBMA could have
fixed targets for expenditure in some critical areas with the provision that
in case these targets and those of revenue balance are not met, the
government must reduce its administrative expenses.  At the same time
it is also necessary to reduce wastage and plug leakages in the
government’s expenditure programmes. 33
            The Government of India made a Medium-Term Review of
States’ Fiscal Reforms Facility for the period 2000-01 to 2004-05.
Accordingly, on the basis of the performance of each state on a single
monitorable indicator, i.e., revenue deficit as a percentage of revenue
receipts, the states are divided into four categories.  Punjab is placed in
category III – initial improvement and then deterioration, on the basis of
revenue surplus/deficit as percentage of revenue receipts.  As per the
given data, Punjab always had a higher revenue deficit as percentage of
revenue receipts as against the all-India average between 1999-2000
and 2002-03.  In 2001-02, the deficit of Punjab was double of that for all
states.  According to the formula used by the GoI, the ‘non-special
category’ states whose ratio of consolidated debt to revenue receipts
exceeds 300 percent are considered as ‘highly stressed’ states in terms
of debt and debt servicing.  Punjab, unfortunately, falls in this category.
           RBI study of State budgets for the year 2003-04 ranks the states
on the basis of various indicators of fiscal effort. The status of Punjab is
given as follows:
•  In terms of growth rate in RR and TE of 2003-04(B.E.) over
2002-03 (R.E.), Punjab has lower rate of growth in terms of
both.
•  Punjab figures in the highest category, i.e., above 25 percent
in terms of interest payments to RR ratio (average for 1996-
2002).
•  Punjab falls in the medium range of 10-15 percent average
annual rate of growth in debt during 2001-02 to 2003-04.
•  However, the debt-NSDP ratio for 2001-02 is above 50
percent, i.e., Punjab falls in the highest category.
The Medium-term Review of States’ Fiscal Reforms Facility and
the RBI study affirm the critical fiscal situation in Punjab as already
discussed in section III.               
VI.   Conclusions34
          A perusal of the finances of the Government of Punjab shows
large revenue and fiscal deficit year after year indicating continued
macro fiscal imbalances of the state. Increasing dependence on the RBI
and the continuous application of borrowed funds largely on current
consumption and debt servicing indicates unsustainability and reflects
vulnerability of the state finances. An increase in the ratio of fiscal
liabilities to GSDP together with a large revenue deficit indicates that the
state is gradually getting into a debt trap. Thus the state needs to
generate more revenue out of its existing assets. Only through reducing
revenue/fiscal deficit by compressing non-developmental expenditure in
a medium-term framework, prudential debt management, and
transparency in fiscal operations, can long term fiscal stability be
achieved.  
   The systematic failure in Punjab is discernible as reflected by its
declining growth rate and unfavourable fiscal parameters. The
assessment of the entire fiscal reform process in the state reflects that
the government has failed to honour its own commitments from time to
time and has also shown utter disregard for certain constitutional
provisions. The non-transparencies in the utilisation of funds are all too
obvious. So a mere enactment of acts and legislations is not enough to
put the once glorious economy of Punjab on the path of socio-economic
development so much associated with the state.
Fiscal imbalances in the state, to a great extent, have been the
result of lack of transparency and accountability. Non-transparent tax
concession, quasi-fiscal subsidies and off-budget spending all contribute
to such imbalances. Fiscal transparency requires a high degree of fiscal
marksmanship. It also consists of a transparent regulatory framework,
open public procurement and employment practices, a code of conduct
for officials and published performance audits. Restoration of financial
discipline calls for bringing in all extra-budgetary transactions into the
consolidated fund.  The application of funds outside the consolidated
fund should be subjected to the same rigours as the budgeting process
through appropriate auditing mechanisms and periodic reviews.  A
restructuring of government expenditure needs to focus on its functional
aspects and eliminate programmes that are no longer relevant.  A
reduction in subsidies by increasing user charges for services delivered
is another step towards fiscal consolidation. Unless the state’s finances
are looked at in totality on a continuous basis and come up for close35
scrutiny in the legislature and outside, it will be difficult to ensure
adequate transparency and accountability. 
The state has to pursue the fiscal reform programme towards
achieving fiscal balance and consolidation and generation of quality
infrastructure and competitive environment. This will be met with stiff
opposition from various quarters and will be an arduous task.  But the
success of the entire reform programme depends on how far the
government is able to resist the temptation for populist measures. If the
government continues to succumb to the populist political pressure, the
fiscal crisis in Punjab will only deepen. The enactment of the legal and
constitutional changes ensures some semblance of financial discipline
on a sustainable basis. But the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget
Management Act can be successful only if government is held to account
by civil society comprising media, academics, and public. In order to
achieve the desired goals, political will, administrative competence and
good governance are necessary. 36
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